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LAETRILE: STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON THE REGULATION OF
INEFFECTIVE DRUGS
I. INTRODUCTION

The promotion of fraudulent and ineffective cancer remedies
presents a continuing challenge to the medical establishment 1 and
the public authorities charged with regulating various aspects of
health care. Despite the imposition of governmental restrictions on
the advertising and marketing of health care products, cancer
patients, due to their vulnerability to exploitation and serious
physical harm, have failed to benefit fully from the regulation of
drug production and distribution.2 Controversy during the 1970's
has focused on laetrile,3 also known as amygdalin or vitamin 1,
a substance allegedly effective for the treatment of cancer.,
1 See 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,795-96 (1977). See also notes 208-11 infra &
accompanying text.
2 See Janssen, Cancer Quackery: Past and Present, FDA CoNsUMR, July-August
1977, at 27; Comment, California Cancer Quack Laws: The Best Is None Too Good,
40 S. CAL. L. REv. 384 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Quack Laws].
3
Laetrile, or amygdalin, is a member of the chemical nitrilosides group. It
occurs naturally in the pits of apricots, peaches, bitter almonds, and in other plant
materials. The substance can be processed into tablets or liquids used for injections.
See Lewis, Laetrile, W.J. MED., July 1977, at 55; 42 Fed. Reg. 10,066-67 (1977).
Although proponents of laetrile claim that apricot extracts were used for health
care by ancient civilizations and nineteenth century European physicians, the modem
purified form of laetrile was developed by Ernst T. Krebs, Jr., a California biochemist,
in 1952. Krebs manufactured and prescribed his treatment privately, and actively
promoted its use by cancer patients. See [1978] FooD DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH)
142,295; 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,788 (1977). Krebs' initiatives aroused the concern
of the California medical establishment, but no formal action was taken against the
prescription of laetrile until the California legislature passed the "Cancer Quackery"
law in 1959, CAL. HEATH & SAFr CODE § 1707.1 (West 1970). This Act prohibits the sale, prescription, and use of any substance for the treatment of cancer
unless it is approved for marketing by the FDA or the State Board of Health. The
use of laetrile was banned pursuant to the statute in September 1963 after a review
of case histories from several states and foreign countries. 17 CAL. AD. CODE
§ 10400.1 (1963). See generally Quack Laws, supra note 2.
4 M. CuLBEREt, Vr~mr.
B 17, at 53 (1974). A number of courts have equated
laetrile and amygdalin in their decisions. See United States v. Spectro Foods Corp.,
544 F.2d 1175, 1178 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976); Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp.
1287, 1295 n.17 (W.D. Okla. 1977), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July
10, 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78605); United States v. General Research Laboratories, 397 F. Supp. 197, 198 (C.D.
Cal. 1975).
Proponents have made a variety of medical claims for laetrile, including the
prevention and treatment of cancer, facilitation of other types of cancer therapy,
relief of pain, reduction of odor and blood pressure, treatment of sickle cell anemia
and parasitic diseases, and regulation of intestinal flora. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767,
39,772-73 (1977).
(233)
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Until recently, laetrile was an unapproved "new drug" under
the regulations of the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), and
could not be manufactured, sold, or distributed in interstate commerce. 6 The federal ban on laetrile forced its supporters to consider three courses of action. First, thousands of cancer patients
avoided the prohibition by purchasing the drug illegally or by
seeking laetrile treatments in other countries.7 Second, an organized laetrile lobby sought political support for a relaxation of the
ban. These efforts occasionally were successful; seventeen states
have legalized the prescription and use of laetrile as a cancer
treatment within their respective borders. 8 Third, laetrile supporters attacked the validity of the FDA's ban, on both statutory
and constitutional grounds, in two types of judicial proceedings:
criminal actions brought by federal authorities to enforce the ban,9
and individual suits seeking injunctive relief to obtain laetrile for
personal use. 10 This Comment will focus upon the third course of
6 [1978] FooD DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH) 1[42,295.
7 See Am. MED. NEWS, December 19, 1977, at 11, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Sept. 3,
1975, at 36, col. 3 (letter to the editor from Dean Burk and laetrile supporters).
8 [1978] Food DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH) 1f42,292. The 17 states that have
legalized laetrile include Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. Pro-laetrile campaigns failed, however, in 14 states
in 1978 as a result of legislative opposition or gubernatorial vetoes. Id.
9 The FDA takes legal action against drug companies that manufacture laetriletype health products, on the grounds that the seized products are misbranded,
poisonous, or unapproved for distribution in interstate commerce. See, e.g., United
States v. Articles of Food & Drug, 441 F. Supp. 772 (E.D. Wisc. 1977) (upholding
an injunction prohibiting defendant manufacturer from producing or distributing
laetrile); United States v. Spectro Foods Corp., Civ. No. 76-101 (D.N.J. March 4),
aff'd in part, re'd in part, 544 F.2d 1175 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. General
Research Laboratories, 397 F. Supp. 197 (C.D. Cal. 1975). Individuals have also
been prosecuted for conspiracy to smuggle laetrile and for illegal importation of the
drug. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1977); United States
v. Westover, 511 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1009 (1975); Hanson
v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 540 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976).
Although they are in the minority, some courts have responded leniently to laetrilerelated prosecutions. See, e.g., Millet, Pit & Seed Co., Inc. v. United States, 436
F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (apricot kernels held to be food rather than a drug);
People v. Richardson, Civ. No. 41953-C (Cal., Berkeley-Albany Mun. Ct., May 8,
1974) (case against physician dismissed for inadequate evidence of intent to treat
cancer); In re Jones, No. D-1509 (Cal., Board of Medical Examiners, November 26,
1975) (doctor on probation for using laetrile in violation of state law).
10 A number of other state and federal courts have struck down the FDA prohibition of laetrile on constitutional grounds or have carved out equitable exceptions. See Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977)
(district court granted injunctive relief to broad class of cancer patients), aff'd as
modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W.
3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605); Rizzo v. United States, 432 F. Supp.
356 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (district court granted preliminary injunction to terminal
cancer patient, enjoining the FDA from preventing the importation and use of a
three months' supply of laetrile by the patient); Carnohan v. United States, Civ.
No. 77-0010-GT (S.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 1977) (district court granted preliminary in-
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action, and will examine the merits of the judicial responses to
these statutory and constitutional attacks.
The most important recent development in the ongoing laetrile
controversy is the decision of the Tenth Circuit in Rutherford v.
United States 11 ("Rutherford VI"). The Rutherford VI court permanently enjoined and restrained the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") and the FDA from interfering with
junction to a terminal cancer patient, allowing him to import and use a three-month
supply of laetrile); People v. Privitera, 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764
(1977) (California statute prohibiting the sale or use of unapproved cancer drugs
invaded the patients' and doctors' zones of privacy); Suenram v. Society of Valley
Hospital, 155 N.J. Super. 593, 383 A.2d 143 (1977) (court enjoined hospital from
interfering with cancer patient's use of laetrile, holding that the patient's right of
privacy allowed her to determine her own personal destiny).
11 No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W.
3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605). The Rutherford VI decision was the culmination of a series of cases initiated by cancer victim Glen L. Rutherford. In 1975,
petitioner Rutherford and other cancer patients initiated an action against the Secretary of HEW in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma,
seeking an order directing the agency to desist from prohibiting the administration
of laetrile. The court granted equitable injunctive relief, holding that plaintiffs had
been denied the right to use laetrile without just cause or due process. Rutherford
v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (Rutherford I), aff'd, remanded on other grounds, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976), modified on remand,
424 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Okla.), modified, 429 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Olda. 1977).
The Tenth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction on appeal, remanding the case
to the district court to determine whether the FDA had developed an administrative
record adequate to support its prohibition of laetrile. Rutherford v. United States,
542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976) (Rutherford II), modified on remand, 424 F. Supp.
105 (W.D. Okla.), modified, 429 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Okla. 1977). On remand, the
district court held that in view of the absence of an administrative record, the determination that laetrile was a prohibited "new drug" could not stand, and remanded
the case to the FDA for compilation of an administrative record to support its
determination by substantial evidence. Rutherford v. United States, 424 F. Supp.
105 (W.D. Okla.) (Rutherford III), modified, 429 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
The Rutherford III court also certified plaintiffs' suit as a class action, and continued
to enjoin the FDA from preventing plaintiffs' importation or interstate transportation
of laetrile for their own use.
Plaintiffs next moved to clarify their class action by requesting an extension of
the injunction to all cancer victims and their spouses. Rutherford v. United States,
429 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (Rutherford IV). The district court declined
to broaden the injunction, but it certified that all patients declared by a practicing
physician to be terminally ill were entitled to injunctive relief.
In compliance with these decisions, the FDA conducted a rulemaking proceeding
in May 1977 on the regulatory status of laetrile. After hearing oral and written
testimony on the issues, the Commissioner concluded that laetrile was an unapproved
new drug under the provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, and therefore
was barred from interstate commerce. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767 (1977). The Commissioner's action was declared unlawful and vacated on judicial review in Rutherford
v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (Rutherford V), aff'd as
modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W.
3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605). The district court found that the FDA's
determination was not supported by substantial evidence, and ruled that laetrile was
exempt from the new drug requirements of the statute. The court also held that
the prohibition of laetrile use violated the fundamental right of privacy of cancer
patients, and accordingly granted injunctive relief to "[any] person who is, or believes
he is, suffering from the disease." Id. 1301. The Government sought review of the
district court's decision in the Rutherford VI adjudication.
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the procurement and personal use of laetrile by medically certified
terminally-ill cancer patients. 12 The court also ordered the FDA
to promulgate regulations "with all due dispatch" for the use of
laetrile by terminal patients, as if the drug had been found safe and
effective for such patients, and in so doing interfered with the
FDA's listing of laetrile as an unapproved new drug.13 In reaching
this result, the court determined that the FDA's "safety" and "effectiveness" requirements for new drug approval are inapplicable to
terminally-ill cancer patients who desire to take the drug intravenously.14
By choosing to resolve the case through the creation of a statutory exception for terminal patients, the Tenth Circuit sidestepped
two important issues. First, the court ignored the underlying statutory question of laetrile's general status as an unapproved new drug
governed by the FDA. In contrast, the district court in Rutherford
v. United States 15 ("Rutherford" V) had held that laetrile was
exempted from regulation by a statutory grandfather clause.
Second, the Rutherford VI opinion failed to address the constitutionality of the laetrile ban. The Rutherford V court, in addition
to its statutory holding, had ruled that federal regulation of laetrile
The court enforced
violated the privacy rights of cancer patients.'
these constitutional rights by granting injunctive relief to any person
"who is, or believes he is, suffering from the disease." 17 Similarly,
in People v. Privitera,8 the California Court of Appeals reversed a
conviction for selling laetrile, an illegal unapproved cancer treatment under state law,' 9 on the ground that the statute in question
invaded the privacy rights of both patients and doctors as protected
by the state 2 0 and federal constitutions.
This Comment will examine the statutory and constitutional
status of the laetrile regulations in light of these recent developments. It begins with an examination of the policies and procedures
12 No. 77-2049, slip op. at 6 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. filed,
47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605).
:1 Id.
14Id. 5.
15438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977), affd as modified, No. 77-2049 (1Oth
Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978)
(No. 78-605).
16 Id. 1301.
17 Id. 1298-1301.
1874 Cal. App. 3d 936, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1977).
19 CAL. HEALTH & SAFT CODE § 1707.1 (West 1970).
20
The California Constitution guarantees a right of privacy to Californians.
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
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of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the "Act"). 21 Following this background discussion, the Comment applies the statute to
laetrile, concluding that laetrile is properly classified as an unapproved new drug under the Act, and is legitimately barred from
interstate commerce. An in-depth criticism of the Rutherford VI
decision follows, in which the Comment questions the assumptions
of the Tenth Circuit and concludes that the terminal patient
exemption is not statutorily justified. The focus of the Comment
then shifts to the constitutional considerations implicit in laetrile
control. The privacy rights of cancer victims are examined in light
of recent cases on the subject, and are balanced against the government's interest in maintaining the current regulatory procedures.
The primary governmental concerns-protecting public safety, preventing the delay of effective treatment, and preventing the deception of the public-are found to be sufficiently compelling to justify
the regulation of laetrile for all classes of cancer patients. Finally,
suggested alternatives to the current procedures are examined, but
are dismissed as inadequate to further these compelling governmental interests.
II.

STATUTORY BOUNDARIES OF

FDA

DRUG REGULATIONS

Initially, the validity of the laetrile prohibition depends upon
the applicability of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the
"Act") 22 to the drug. If, as laetrile supporters claim and the
Rutherford V court held,23 the drug is not banned by the Act, there
is no need to consider the constitutional implications of the prohibition. In resolving the issue of statutory construction, three
essential questions must be answered: (1) What is the framework of
the Act? (2) How does laetrile fit within this framework in light
of the current scientific data? and (3) Does the Act apply to all
classes of patients, or is there an exemption for the terminally ill?
A. The Statutory Framework
1. Congressional Policy
The first congressional effort to regulate drugs on a national
scale was the Food and Drug Act of 1906.24 This legislation set
2121 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976).
22

Id.

23

Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977),

af'd as

modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W.
3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605).
24 Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed by the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938)).
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purity standards for drugs transported in interstate commerce 25
and required all manufacturers to list the full contents of a product
on its label.26 Although Congress also sought to prevent false therapeutic claims by manufacturers and promoters through amendments
to the 1906 Act in 1912,27 the 1906 Food and Drug Act proved ineffective in establishing pre-marketing or post-marketing standards
28

for drug safety and efficacy.
The 1988 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 2 9 replaced the 1906
Act, and attempted to establish these standards. It created a
new application ("NDA") process for pre-marketing review of drug
safety3 ° and prohibited the distribution of adulterated, impure,
or misbranded drugs and devices. 31 These regulations were to be
enforced by a Food and Drug Administration, empowered to seize
illegal products, 2 initiate criminal proceedings, 33 or seek injunctive
remedies. 84 The legislation failed, however, to police drugs effectively or to establish fair procedures and prices in the drug
industry.s5
Despite the inadequacies of this legislation, there was significant
resistance to changes in the Act, until the thalidomide crisis in
Europe provided the necessary impetus for unanimous congressional
action on drug reform legislation. 36 The ensuing 1962 Kefauver25 Id.
26 Id.

§7, 34 Stat. at 769.
§ 8, 34 Stat. at 770.

27 Act of Aug. 23, 1912, ch. 352, 37 Stat. 416 (1912) (repealed by the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 90 2(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938)).
28 See Janssen, supra note 2, at 28; Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug
Amendments, 60 GEo. L.J. 185, 186 (1971).
29
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(currently codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976) ).
30Id. §§201(p) & 505, 52 Stat. at 1041 & 1052. Under the 1938 Act, the
effectiveness of a new drug was not a matter for agency concern. A new drug
application automatically became effective within 60 days unless the Secretary of
Agriculture refused to approve it due to inadequate evidence of safety. Id. §§ 505
(c) & (d), 52 Stat. at 1052 (1938). The present version requires the Secretary of
HEW to approve the application, deny it, or give notice of a hearing within 180
days of filing. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c) & (d) (1976).
31 Id. § 501, 52 Stat. at 1049 (adulterated drugs and devices); § 502, 52 Stat.
at 1050 (misbranded drugs and devices).
32 Id. § 304, 52 Stat. at 1044.
33 Id. § 303, 52 Stat. at 1043.
34 Id. § 302, 52 Stat. at 1043.
35 The problems of federal drug regulation were publicized by the "Kefauver
Hearings" of 1960 and 1961. This investigation into drug industry practices and
prices was carried out by the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee. See S. REP. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 [hereinafter
cited as 1962 SENAT.-E REPORT], reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2884, 2887.
36 Id. at 40, [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2905. The Judiciary
Committee initially made significant amendments to the proposed reform legislation,
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Harris Drug Amendments 3 significantly altered the scope and substance of the federal regulations. First, the amendments initiated
the requirement that new drugs must be scientifically established as
safe and effective prior to marketing.38 The Senate Committee noted
that "[t]he only sound standard is that a drug must be safe and that
there must be substantial evidence showing that the drug has produced the specific physiological effects claimed for it." 39 This
standard reflected the views of several senators on the committee
that "the marketing of a safe but ineffective drug may well be positively injurious to the public health.

When an ineffective drug is

prescribed, it is usually in place of an older but effective drug."

40

Second, the new Act amended the new drug application process

41

and created procedures for the post-marketing withdrawal of unsafe
and ineffective drugs. 42 Third, the statute adopted high scientific
standards for testing and a strict legal standard of proof.43 The intended impact of these changes was "to strengthen the laws designed
to keep unfit drugs off the market in the first instance and speed
their removal should they reach the market." 44
2. New Drug Marketing Procedures
The crucial statutory issue confronting laetrile supporters is
whether laetrile can be categorized as a "new drug" within the
meaning given that term by the 1962 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
but reinstated the more stringent provisions after the thalidomide incident. See
Drug Amendments, [1962] CoNG. Q. ALm. 197-98.
37
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976)).
38 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1976).
39 1962 SENArTE RonRT, supra note 35, at 9, [1962] U.S. CODE CoNG. & An.
NEws at 2892.
40 Id. at 37, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS at 2902 (views of Senators Kefauver,
Carroll, Dodd, Hart, and Long).
41 The present application process consists of three steps. Initially, a drug's
sponsor must conduct animal studies or collect data and file a "Notice of Claimed
Investigational Exemption for a New Drug" (IND) with the FDA. 21 U.S.C. § 355
(i)(1) (1976). If these studies demonstrate that the new drug is reasonably safe,
the FDA will approve the IND and permit the sponsor to distribute the drug for
investigational use on humans. Id. § 355(i). After the completion of these tests,
the sponsor files a New Drug Application setting forth all available information on
the safety and effectiveness of the drugs. Id. § 355(b). Approval of this application
certifies the drug for commercial marketing and use.
42 Id. § 355(e).
43 Id. § 355(d). This section requires that all applications be supported by
"substantial evidence," defined as "evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved . . . :1
44 1962 SENATE REPoRT, supra note 35, at 8, [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws at 2884.
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only after filing and approval of a
resolution of this question depends
the definitional standards of the Act
exemptions it provides for certain

a. DefinitionalStandards
The 1962 Drug Amendments define a "new drug" as follows:
"Any drug .

.

. the composition of which is such that such drug

is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of
drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling." 45 Under this definition, a manufacturer must show by substantial evidence 46 that the
"drug"47 in question is generally recognized as safe and effective in
order to avoid filing a detailed new drug application 4s and satisfying its strict standard of proof. This process is not directly concerned with the actual safety and effectiveness of the product; 49
instead, the focus is on the general perception of the product among
knowledgeable members of the scientific and medical communities.
4521 U.S.C. §321(p)(1) (1976) (original version at ch. 675, 52 Stat 1040
(1938)) (emphasis added).
46 See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott, & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 617
(1973); North Am. Pharm., Inc. v. Dep't of HEW, 491 F.2d 546, 551 (8th Cir.
1973).
47 The status of a substance as a drug depends upon its intended use. Any
article "intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease in man or other animals" is a drug within the meaning of the Act. 21
U.S.C. §321(g)(1)(B) (1976) (original version at ch. 675, §201(g)(1)(B), 52
Stat 1040 (1938)). As a result, the fact that a product is technically a food or
cosmetic does not mean that it cannot also be a drug. If the product is labeled,
advertised, or promoted as a drug, it may be inferred that it is intended to be a
drug. See United States v. Nutrition Serv., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 375, 380-81 (W.D.
Pa. 1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1965).
48 An NDA must contain all available information on the drug in question.
The submission is specifically required to include the following: a table of contents,
a summary, favorable and unfavorable evidence of safety and effectiveness, copies
of all labeling, a list of components, a description of manufacturing methods, samples
of the drug and its components, and all reports of preclinical investigations. 21
C.F.R. § 314.1 (1977).
49 See AMP Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825, 831 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nor.
AMP Inc. v. Cohen, 393 U.S. 825 (1968); United States v. Articles of Drug Labeled
Colchicine, 442 F. Supp. 1236, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); National Ethical Pharm.
Ass'n v. Weinberger, 365 F. Supp. 735, 736-37 (D.S.C. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1051
(4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Article of Drug "Mykocert," 345 F. Supp. 571,
574 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Because actual safety and effectiveness are not at issue, a
determination that a product is a new drug does not necessarily mean that it is
unsafe or ineffective. See United States v. 1,048,000 Capsules, More or Less,
"Afrodex," 494 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Several questions, implicit in the statutory definition, remain
to be answered: (1) What institutional authority determines a
product's status as a new drug? (2) What degree of expert consensus
is sufficient to demonstrate general recognition? (3) Which research
procedures are acceptable bases for general recognition? (4) What
factors may be considered as evidence of a lack of general recognition?
The FDA initially determines a particular drug's status as a
"new drug" within the meaning of the Act.5 0 This allocation of
authority to an administrative agency reflects Congress's desire to
have the complex technical and scientific issues of drug regulation
decided by experts rather than by the courts. 51 Although their
jurisdiction is limited at the outset, federal courts may review a
"new drug" order pursuant to the terms of the Administrative
Procedure Act 52 or the general equity powers of the court.5 3 The
reviewing court is not allowed to substitute its own factual views
for those of the agency, but it can engage in a substantial inquiry
that is both "searching and careful." 5
The courts have not been consistent in their interpretation of
the "general recognition" standard. Originally, several courts held
that the existence of any genuine difference of opinion sufficed to
demonstrate that the drug in question was not generally recognized
as safe and effective. 5 This rule, however, has been criticized as
requiring unanimous, rather than general, recognition.5 6 Thus, the
current view is that "general" should be accorded its commonsense
50 See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 652-54 (1973);
Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 626 (1973); CIBA
Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640, 643 (1973).
51 See id. 643-44; Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 37 (D. Minn.
1976); Lemmon Pharm. Co. v. Richardson, 319 F. Supp. 375, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
One writer has suggested that an individual should be able to seek immediate relief
in court rather than undergoing a lengthy FDA proceeding in cases in which there
is a dispute over a drug's safety and the individual's situation is so extreme that it
outweighs the state's interest in safety and effectiveness. Comment, Government
Regulation of Health Care Drugs of Questionable Efficacy, 14 SA DiEGo L. REv.
378, 403-04 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Questionable Drugs].
525 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
53See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
Any citizen
aggrieved by an order of the Commissioner may equitably test the legality of that
order In court.
54 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
55 Merritt Corp. v. Folsom, 165 F. Supp. 418, 421 (D.D.C. 1958). See also
United States v. Article of Drug Labeled "Furestrol Vaginal Suppositories," 294
F. Supp. 1307, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. 354 Bulk Cartons . . . Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp. 847,
853 (D.N.J. 1959).
50 See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Drug "Bentex Ulcerine," 469 F.2d
875, 879 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 938 (1973).
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meaning. As one court explained: "There is nothing in the statute
to indicate that Congress intended 'generally recognized' in other
than its commonly understood meaning. The adverb, 'generally,'
is defined, inter alia, to mean, 'In general; extensively, though not
universally; most frequently, but not without exception; * * *'." 57
Whichever standard is applied, however, it is clear that general
recognition requires more than a mere preponderance of the available evidence.
Expert opinions regarding a drug's safety or effectiveness cannot be based on clinical impressions or uncontrolled experiments; 58
the substantial evidence requirement 59 of the Act requires wellcontrolled clinical investigations, based upon recognized scientific
principles. Therefore, only studies that meet designated scientific
standards, as promulgated by the Secretary of HEW, 60 are acceptable
in determining whether evidence exists to support a claim of general recognition. 0 '
The performance of the requisite studies and the collection of
favorable data does not always ensure that the FDA will find the
drug in question to be generally recognized as safe and effective;
the presence of any of the following competing factors may serve to
overcome the favorable inferences that normally attend compliance
with the requirements of the Act. First, the absence of published
medical or scientific literature relating to the drug's usage is considered to be damaging evidence, 2 because studies submitted to
57 Id. (quoting United States v. 7 Cartons, More or Less, "Ferro-Lac Swine
Formula Concentrate (Medicated)," 293 F. Supp. 660, 662-63 (S.D. Ill. 1968),
modified on other grounds, 424 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1970)). Many courts have
applied this standard. See, e.g., AMP Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825, 831 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. AMP Inc. v. Cohen, 393 U.S. 825 (1968); United States v.
X-Otag Plus Tablets, 441 F. Supp. 105, 110 (D. Colo. 1977); United States v.
1,048,000 Capsules, More or Less, "Afrodex," 347 F. Supp. 768, 770 (S.D. Tex.
1972), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1974). A Senate Report accompanying the
1962 Drug Amendments expressed this interpretation. 1962 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 35, [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2884. Further, the FDA has also
shown a willingness to define "general" as "'extensive." See 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767,
39,776 (1977).
58 See Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 630
(1973). The absence of laboratory testing, experimentation, and investigation is
evidence of a lack of general recognition. United States v. An Article of Drug
"Bentex Ulcerine," 469 F.2d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 938
(1973); United States v. 14 Cases, More or Less, (Bag) "Naremco Medli-matic,"
374 F. Supp. 922, 929 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
59 See note 43 supra.
60 21 C.F.R. § 314.111(a) (5) (1977).
61 See Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 629-30
(1973); Sterling Drug Inc. v. Weinberger, 503 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir. 1974).
2 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 652 (1973);
United States v. 41 Cases, More or Less, 420 F.2d 1126, 1130 (5th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Articles of Drug Labeled Colchicine, 442 F. Supp. 1236, 1242-43
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scientific publications undergo professional review prior to publication and thus contribute to the circulation of information about
the drug. Second, if the composition of a drug or one of its ingredients is unknown, a finding of general recognition will be precluded. 63 Third, it is significant if a given product is not discussed
or used at medical schools. 64 These and other background factors
supplement the required showings of adequate testing and extensive
recognition among experts.
b. Grandfather Clause Exemptions
Another way for a manufacturer to avoid compliance with the
new drug application procedures is to establish an exemption for
the drug before the FDA 65 under either of the two grandfather
clauses contained in the Act. These clauses permit older drugs to
avoid the safety and effectiveness standards of the 1962 Act, provided they meet certain requirements.
The first grandfather clause, the 1938 exemption, provides that
no drug shall be deemed a new drug "if at any time prior to June
25, 1938, it was subject to the Food and Drug Act of June 30, 1906,
as amended, and if at such time its labeling contained the same
representations concerning the conditions of its use." 66 This exemption applies only to drugs that have undergone no change in
composition, labeling, or recommended conditions of use. 67 In
addition, a grandfather clause exemption does not shield a drug
from other sections of the statute that prohibit the marketing of
toxic, harmful, or misbranded products. 68
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. X-Otag Plus Tablets, 441 F. Supp. 105, 110
(D. Colo. 1977); United States v. An Article of Drug Labeled "Entrol-C Medicated,"
362 F. Supp. 424, 426 (S.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 513 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1975).
03 See United States v. 1,048,000 Capsules, More or Less, "Afrodex," 494 F.2d
1158, 1161 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974); Durovic v. Richardson, 479 F.2d 242, 251 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 944 (1973).
04 Lemmon Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Richardson, 319 F. Supp. 375, 378 (E.D. Pa.
1970).
65
The FDA has initial jurisdiction to decide whether a drug is grandfathered
under the statute. This FDA decision is reviewable in district court pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act. See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S.
645, 651-53 (1973); North Am. Pharm., Inc. v. Dep't of IEW, 491 F.2d 546, 549
(8th Cir. 1973). The finding that a particular drug is grandfathered cannot, however, be inferred; the FDA must take affirmative action to ratify ary such determination. See Levine, Recent "New Drug" Litigation Involving the "Grandfather
Clause" and Hearing Rights, 28 Bus. LAw. 769, 777 (1973).
6621 U.S.C. §321(p)(1) (1976) (original version at ch. 675, §201(p)(1),
52 Stat. 1041 (1938)).
67See Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137, 1142 (10th Cir. 1976);
42 Fed. Beg. 39,767, 39,788 (1977).
68542 F.2d 1137, 1142 n.4 (10th Cir. 1976).
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The second, 1962, grandfather clause exempts certain drugs
otherwise categorized as "new drugs" from meeting the "generally
recognized as effective" requirement. The goal of this clause was
to ensure a smooth transitional period when the 1962 Amendments
became effective. The exemption covers any drug which, on the
day immediately preceeding the enactment date of the Amendments,
was commercially 69 used or sold in the United States, was generally
recognized as safe by qualified experts, and was not covered by an
effective 70 new drug application. The exemption applies if the
drug in question is intended for use under the conditions prescribed 71 or suggested on previous labeling.7 2
The elaborate requirements of the 1962 exemption make it a
difficult one to invoke. A claimant must prove every essential fact 73
required by the terms of the exemption, because grandfather clause
exceptions are strictly construed against the party that invokes their
protection.7 4 This high standard of proof also applies to the FDA's
procedural guidelines for grandfather clause contentions. Applications for a grandfather clause exemption must conform to a specific
69 The phrase "commercially used or sold" has been interpreted to require that
the drug be readily available and broadly distributed in the marketplace. Investigational drugs therefore are excluded from the exemption. See Durovic v. Richardson, 479 F.2d 242, 247-48 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 944 (1973). But see
Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 n.21 (W.D. Okla. 1977),
aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. filed,
47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605).
70 This term includes an application that was once effective; withdrawals only
take place at the behest of the FDA. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott &
Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 632 (1973); USV Pharm. Corp. v. Weinberger, 412
U.S. 655, 667 (1973). Congressional policy exempts only drugs that never were
subject to the new drug provisions of the Act
71 "Conditions of use include, among other things, what the drug is recommended for, how it is to be administered, and in what quantities it is to be administered." 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,792 (1977). A party seeking exemption under
this grandfather clause must demonstrate that the conditions of use recommended
for the new drug used'or sold on October 9, 1962 are the same as those currently
employed. See Tyler Pharm. Dist., Inc. v. Department of HEW, 408 F.2d 95, 99
(7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Allan Drug Corp., 357 F.2d 713, 719 (10th Cir.
1966).
72 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 107(c)(4), 76 Stat. 780
(1962), reprintedin 21 U.S.C. § 321, note (1976).
73 United States v. An Article of Drug "Bentex Ulcerine," 469 F.2d 875, 878
(5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 938 (1973); United States v. Articles of
Drug Labeled Colchicine, 442 F. Supp. 1236, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see 42 Fed.
Reg. 39,767, 39,787 (1977).
74
Durovic v. Richardson, 479 F.2d 242, 250 n.6 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 944 (1973); United States v. An Article of Drug "Bentex Ulcerine," 469 F.2d
875, 878 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 938 (1973); United States v. Articles
of Drug Labeled Colchicine, 442 F. Supp. 1236, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United
States v. 1,048,000 Capsules, More or Less, "Afrodex," 347 F. Supp. 768, 770 (S.D.
Tex. 1972), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1974).
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format and must include evidence of past and present labelings35
Failure to comply with this framework constitutes a complete waiver
of any contentions for an exemption. 76
B. The Regulations Applied
Laetrile supporters and FDA officials have debated the drug's
status under the Act for almost a decade. 7 7 The government maintains that the Act applies to laetrile and thus expressly prohibits its
distribution in interstate commerce. In contrast, laetrile proponents
argue that sufficient evidence exists to prove that laetrile either falls
outside the new drug definition of the Act or is exempted by its
grandfather clauses. Even though the FDA formalized its views on
the drug's legal status in a rulemaking proceeding in 1977,78 the
Rutherford V court's exemption of laetrile from federal regulation
under the 1962 grandfather clause demonstrates the continuing
79
controversy over the drug's statutory status.
7521

C.F.R. §314.200 (e)(2) (1977).

78 Id.
77 This disagreement did not crystallize until recently. For years, the FDA
informally indicated that laetrile was a "new drug" under the Act, but declined to
make a clear determination of the drug's status or develop an administrative record.
See Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 n.5 (W.D. Okla. 1977)
(Rutherford V), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition
for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605); Rutherford v.
United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1212-13 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (Rutherford I),
aff'd, remanded on other grounds, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976) (Rutherford II),
modified on remand, 424 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Okla.) (Rutherford III), modified,
429 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (Rutherford IV). This inaction on the part
of the FDA effectively thwarted efforts to attack the regulations, because the FDA
has the initial authority to decide the status of a drug. See notes 50-51 supra.
If laetrile proponents filed a new drug application, they would have had to admit
that the drug was covered by the statute, and thus was not grandfathered. If they
did not file an application, the FDA would continue to prohibit the drug without
compiling an official record sufficient for judicial review. Rutherford II and
Rutherford III alleviated this problem by declaring that the FDA had, in fact, found
laetrile to be a new drug, and ordered the agency to produce a supporting administrative record. Rutherford H, 542 F.2d at 1143; Rutherford III, 424 F. Supp.
at 107.
7842 Fed. Reg. 39,767 (1977).
This proceeding was held in response to the
order of Rutherford v. United States, 424 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Okla.) (Rutherford
III), modified, 429 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Oka. 1977), see note 77 supra, and was
announced in 42 Fed. Reg. 10,066 (1977). The hearing took place in Kansas City,
Mo., on May 2-3, 1977, and included the testimony of 47 witnesses representing
several different viewpoints, including those of laetrile proponents, laetrile opponents,
consumers, patients, physicians, researchers, therapists, and government officials. 42
Fed. Reg. 39,767-68 (1977). As a result of this hearing, plus several thousand
pages of written submissions, the Commissioner formally confirmed the laetrile ban.

Id.

79 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1301 (W.D. Okla. 1977), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049
(10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10,
1978) (No. 78-605). The court held that the portions of the administrative record
dealing with the 1962 grandfather clause were unsupported, and vacated the Coin-
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1. New Drug Status
The characterization of laetrile as a new drug first requires
evidence that its manufacturers and purchasers intend to use it as a
drug.80 Courts have often found the requisite intent,8 ' because
laetrile is widely publicized as a treatment for cancer and is extensively used for this purpose. Thus, efforts to portray laetrile as a
vitamin or a food in order to escape regulation are unlikely to
succeed. 82 There is much less of a consensus within the medical
and scientific communities regarding laetrile's safety and effectiveness. For this reason, the following analysis of laetrile will consider
all available research on its physical properties as well as prior
judicial assessments of the drug.
a. Safety of Laetrile
The judicial assessments of laetrile's safety involve two distinct
questions: first, whether laetrile is actually safe, and second, whether
it is generally recognized as safe by qualified experts.
The actual safety of laetrile is a matter of concern to courts for
two reasons: (1) If laetrile is unsafe, it may be subject to seizure and

prohibition as an adulterated or misbranded drug, regardless of its
status under the grandfather clauses; 83 and (2) If laetrile is actually
unsafe, this evidence is useful to show that the substance is generally
recognized as unsafe and thus is foreclosed from marketing unless it
satisfies the requirements of the new drug application process.
The dispute over the safety of laetrile centers on the allegation
that laetrile contains hydrogen cyanide, a highly toxic substance
that can be released within the body under certain circumstances.
mission's decision. Laetrile was exempted from the new drug requirements under
the 1962 grandfather clause because the court found it to be generally recognized
as safe in 1962. See text accompanying notes 120-49 infra.
80 See note 47 supra.
81 See, e.g., Gadler v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 244, 247 (D. Minn. 1977);
Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 540 F.2d 947 (8th
Cir. 1976); United States v. General Research Laboratories, 397 F. Supp. 197, 200

(C.D. Cal. 1975).
82 See, e.g., Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137, 1140 (10th Cir. 1976)
(Rutherford II), modified on remand, 424 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Okla.), modified,
429 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30,
35 (D. Minn.), af'd, 540 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976). Cf. Millet, Pit and Seed Co.,
Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 84, 91 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (apricot kernels
characterized as food supplement, rather than drug, because seller made no representations about them; court emphasized that it was not approving apricot kernels
as a disease treatment).
83 Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137, 1142 n.4 (10th Cir. 1976)
(Rutherford II), modified on remand, 424 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Okla.), modified,
429 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Okla. 1977); 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (1976). For a definition
of "misbranded," see 21 U.S.C. § 352(j) (1976).
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This charge has been confirmed by numerous research studies that
indicate that amygdalin and laetrile have caused toxic effects in experimental use.8 4 In addition, the clinical experiences of some
physicians, as well as data collected by researchers, provide evidence
of poisoning and other severe reactions to laetrile, including neurological disease, fever, hemorrhages, and low blood pressure. 85 One
California researcher documented thirty-seven cases of poisoning
and seventeen deaths from the use of laetrile or related fruit
kernels.8 6 Although some claim that only ingested laetrile is dangerous, there is no test data to support this distinction. 7 Thus, the
available scientific data indicate that laetrile is not actually safe for
human use.
Judicial opinions on the actual safety of laetrile are inconclusive. On the basis of evidence presented to them, several federal
courts found laetrile to be toxic,88 and granted injunctions preventing its shipment. 89 On the basis of other evidence, other federal
84 See Sadoff, Fuchs & Hollander, Rapid Death Associated With Laetrile Ingestion, 239 J. AMA 1532 (1978) (California specialists report that liquid laetrile may
induce cyanide poisoning); Schmidt, Laetrile Toxicity Studies in Dogs, 239 J. AMA
943 (1978) (California researchers report that laetrile is highly toxic in dogs when
taken in combination with some common table foods); Smith, Butler, Cohan &
Schein, Laetrile Toxicity: A Report of Two Patients, 62 CANCER TREAT. Rr-,. 169
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Laetrile Toxicity]; CAzTCER NEws, Fall 1973-Winter
1974, at 16 (reporting unsettling evidence of toxicity found by expert oncologists in
1971). But see N.Y. Times, July 12, 1977, at 13, col. 1 (reporting that National
Cancer Institute's tests revealed no toxicity).

85 See Janssen, supra note 2, at 4 (reporting cyanide poisoning death of tenmonth-old child who ingested father's laetrile); Lewis, supra note 3, at 58-59
(reporting incidents of toxicity in California, France, Turkey, Israel, and Germany,
and among American Indians); Townsend & Boni, Cyanide Poisoning From Ingestion
of Apricot Kernels, 24 Monwm MORTAL 427 (1975); The Case of the Crushed
Kernels, 39 CoNstim= REPoRTs 514 (1974); Laetrile: The Making of a Myth, FDA
CoNSumm, December 1976-January 1977, at 8 [hereinafter cited as Laetrile Myth];
Top Health Officials Cite Laetrile Dangers, FDA CoNsumERt, September 1977, at 4
[hereinafter cited as Laetrile Dangers].
86

Laetrile Dangers, supra note 85, at 3.

87 See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,786 (1977) (report of the Ad Hoc Committee for Oncology consultants to the FDA).
88 United States v. Spectro Foods Corp., Civ. No. 76-101 (D.N.J.), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 544 F.2d 1175 (3d Cir. 1976) (adulterated and misbranded); United
States v. General Research Laboratories, 397 F. Supp. 197, 198-99 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(toxic). See Seized Laetrile Valued at $300,000, FDA CoNstma, September 1977,
at 28 (reports Wisconsin court finding that laetrile is unsafe). Even laetrile supporters recognize certain health risks in taking the drug, as evidenced by its labeling.
See 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,786, 39,789 (1977).
89 In United States v. General Research Laboratories, 397 F. Supp. 197 (C.D.
Cal. 1975), the district court granted a permanent injunction. In United States v.
Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175 (3d Cir. 1976), the Third Circuit upheld the
parts of a preliminary injunction that prohibited the interstate shipment of compounds containing laetrile.
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These cases are of

limited utility to a determination of laetrile's present safety in
actual use. First, it is notable that these rulings were made prior
to the publication of the latest scientific studies. Indeed, one court
examined only one objective study of laetrile's toxicity before deciding the issue. 2 Second, the opinions failed to articulate the
standard or techniques used to determine the safety of the drug.
In view of these problems and the mounting scientific evidence of
laetrile's toxicity, the judgment of the scientific community merits
judicial concurrence.
The issue of general recognition has evoked a more uniform
reaction from the judiciary. In United States v. General Research
Laboratories," the court found that "[a]mygdalin [laetrile] is not

generally recognized by experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate its safety, as having been shown through
scientific procedures . . . to be safe under the conditions of its use
in the articles B 17 and Aprikern [laetrile-containing compounds]." 94 Similarly, the Rutherford V court held that laetrile is
not generally recognized as safe, stating that "the evidence of the
record does not render the Commissioner's conclusion that laetrile
is not 'generally recognized as safe and effective' arbitrary and
capricious." Il
The conclusion reached by these courts was mandated by several
facts. First, the Supreme Court's requirement that findings of
general recognition be based on "substantial evidence," including
published scientific data, 96 was not satisfied. Second, the substance
and weight of the scientific reports on laetrile's safety suggest that
there is a substantial difference of opinion 97 regarding laetrile's
90 Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1297 (W.D. Okla. 1977),
aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47
U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605). The Rutherford I court specifically found that laetrile is nontoxic and an effective cancer remedy. Rutherford v.
United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (W.D. Okla. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1137
(10th Cir. 1976) (the government introduced no evidence in regard to these issues).
91 Rizzo v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 356, 359 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (court
granted preliminary injunction to enable plaintiff to import laetrile for his own use).
92 Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1297 n.23 (W.D. Okla.
1977), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert.
filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605).
93397 F. Supp. 197 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
94 Id. 199.
95 Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1293 (W.D. Okla. 1977),
aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47
U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605).
96 See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 632
(1973); 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,775-76 (1977).
97 See notes 55-57 supra.
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safety, a fact that negates the possibility of a generally-recognized
consensus about the drug. Third, conflicting testimony at the
FDA's rule-making proceeding 98 and before the two courts demonstrates that there is no expert consensus on the issue of laetrile's
safety.
b. Effectiveness of Laetrile
A pivotal issue in resolving the laetrile controversy is the drug's
effectiveness; the resolution of this issue has several implications.
First, if laetrile were generally recognized as safe, it would also have
to be generally recognized as effective in order to avoid the premarketing requirements of the new drug application process.
Second, if laetrile is actually effective in treating cancer, restrictions
on its use are much more difficult to justify: an effective cancer
treatment, even if unsafe, would be a medical boon. Under such
circumstances, a determination of laetrile's marketability should
balance the degree of actual effectiveness against the magnitude of
the danger from use of the drug. Third, a finding of actual effectiveness would adversely affect a court's decision regarding the constitutionality of the laetrile ban, since the government has a
diminished interest in keeping effective cancer remedies off the
market.
In evaluating the available objective evidence of laetrile's
actual effectiveness, it is important to note that the drug has been
subjected to extensive testing, often by qualified researchers.9 9 Most
laetrile researchers, however, have investigated the drug's effects
on animal, rather than human, tumor systems. Although these tests
do not fulfill statutory requirements, it is standard research procedure to screen out potential active chemotherapeutic agents
through animal testing. If the animal tumors show a beneficial
response to a substance, this provides a basis for clinical testing on
humans 1 00
The record indicates that laetrile has been investigated more
than a dozen times, and the conclusion of each study has been that
98

Fourteen cancer experts and researchers gave testimony or affidavits to the

FDA indicating that laetrile has never been generally recognized as safe, nor has it
been proven to be safe in fact. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,786-87 (1977). In contrast,
a number of physicians testified before the Oklahoma District Court to the effect
that their experiences showed laetrile to be nontoxic in common doses. Rutherford
v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1297 n.23 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
99 Lewis, supra note 3, at 56.
100 See 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,781 (1977); Laetrile Myth, supra note 85, at 7.
The "FDA has been on record for years as being prepared to approve human tests
of Laetrile if experts in cancer found evidence to justify them." Id. See also note
41 supra.
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laetrile is worthless in preventing, curing, or inhibiting cancerous
growths. 1 1 For example, the Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer
Research concluded, after a four-year study, that no evidence exists
showing that laetrile is beneficial. 10 2 The National Cancer Insti03
tute's researchers also found laetrile to be ineffective.
Most clinical reports parallel the unfavorable animal tumor
results. Physicians from several nations have reported, on the
bases of case studies and clinical investigations, that laetrile
The evidence to the confails to control human cancer. 1'101 See 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,780 (1977) (reporting study of the Institute
von Ardenne in 1973); Culliton, Sloan-Kettering: The Trials of an Apricot Pit-973,
182 SCIENCE 1000 (1973) (Sloan-Kettering Institute); Hill, Shine, Hill & Miller,
Failure of Amygdalin to Arrest B16 Melanoma and BW5147 AKR Leukemia, 36
CANCER RIEs. 2102 (1976) (Washington University School of Medicine); Laster &
Schabel, Experimental Studies of the Antitumor Activity of Amygdalin MF (NSC15780) Alone and in Combination With B-Glucosidase (NSC-128056), 59 CANCER
CHEMOTHER. REP. 951 (1975) (Southern Research Institute); Levi, French, Beckis
& Henderson, Laetrile: A Study of its Physico-Chemical Properties, 92 CAN. MED.
Assoc. J. 1057 (1965); Lewis, supra note 3, at 56 (reporting studies of the National
Cancer Institute in 1957, 1960, 1969, 1973, 1975, of the Scind Research and Development Company in 1968, and of the Cancer Commission of the California Medical
Association in 1953); Wodinsky & Swiniarski, Antitumor Activity of Amygdalin
MF (NSC-15780) as a Single Agent and With B-Glucosidase (NSC-128050) on a
Spectrum of Transplantable Rodent Tumors, 59 CANCER CHEMOTHER. REP. 939
(1975) (study conducted by the Arthur D. Little Company); N.Y. Times, July 17,
1977, § 4, at 10, col. 1 (reporting study of the Battelle Medical Institute of Columbus,
Ohio).
But see 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,780 (1977) (unpublished study from Pasteur
Institute reported in 1971). It is notable that all of the other drugs known to have
a positive effect in certain cancer cases have demonstrated significant activity in
animal tumor systems. Id. 39,781; Testimony Invited on the Status of Laetrile,
FDA CONSUMR, March 1977, at 26.

The FDA Commissioner concluded, upon examination of available studies, that
there is no evidence to warrant the belief that laetrile has anticancer activity in
laboratory animals, 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,781 (1977).
'o2 Janssen, supra note 2, at 5; 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,780 (1977). A spokesman for the Institute concluded that there is no scientific evidence from the animal
investigations to warrant conducting human tests. He also noted that the positive
preliminary results obtained by one researcher in 1973 have never been duplicated.
103 N.Y. Times, July 12, 1977, at 13, col. 1.
104 See 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,778-79 (reporting study of case histories by
1963 Cancer Advisory Council of California Department of Health); California Medical Ass'n, Report: The Treatment of Cancer with Laetriles, 78 CAL. MED. 320 (1953);
Lewis, supra note 3, at 56 (1970 study of laetrile in clinical trials at Mexican cancer
center); Marrone, Chemotherapy of Inoperable Cancer, 20 Exp. MED. Suye. 299
(1962) (case reports of American researcher); Navarro, Lactrile-The Ideal AntiCancer Drug?, 9 ST. THOMAS J. MED. 468 (1954) (investigational study by Filipino
specialist); CANCER NEws, Fall 1973-Winter 1974, at 16 (1973 study of 190 case
histories by the California Public Health Department).
The National Cancer Institute recently initiated a study of cancer patients who
have used laetrile, asking physicians to submit names of consenting patients who
may have shown a response to the drug. In response, the Institute received information from 93 patients, but only 22 of the case histories were sufficiently documented
and controlled to warrant review. Study of these cases revealed that six patients
had shown improvement after laetrile treatment, but the drug's adverse or negligible
effects on the other 16 patients rendered the study inconclusive. As a result of this
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trary 105 is generally undocumented in form and unscientific in
methodology.1 06
Notwithstanding the existence of clear evidence that the physiological effects of laetrile are minimal, proponents of laetrile claim
that the drug is effective because it is psychologically beneficial,
especially for pain reduction. 0 7 Even assuming that this is true,
Iaetrile is not "effective" within the intent of the statute. Congress
did not choose to legalize drugs that have unpredictable or negligible effects. The use of the word "effective" by Congress implies
that a drug must have a proven capacity for producing the desired
result, not merely the potential to do So. 1 08 Thus, evidence indicating that laetrile may cause a psychological uplift in some patients
only demonstrates that the drug is potentially helpful or efficacious
for the treatment of cancer, but not effective for this purpose.
Courts have not held that laetrile is generally recognized as an
effective cancer treatment, 10 9 basing their reluctance upon the broad
consensus against the drug within the scientific and medical communities. The nation's leading medical and cancer-fighting institutions maintain that laetrile is not a helpful cancer cure or treatminimal evidence of anti-tumor effects and the widespread use of laetrile pursuant
to the Rutherford VI injunction, however, the NCI has announced plans to resolve
conclusively the issue of effectiveness, through clinical testing on several hundred
terminal patients. The NCI intends to review the records of these patients and
initiate human tests if there is any evidence of antitumor effects. Laetrile Evaluation
Underway at NCI, 239 J. AMA 19 (1978); Philadelphia Inquirer, September 28,
1978, § A, at 3, col. 3.
1o6 See 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,777-78 (1977) (testimony of three physicians
who administer laetrile, about their own case studies); Lewis, supra note 3, at 58
(1970 study of 35 case histories by German researcher); N.Y. Times, December 21,
1975, at 40, col. I (physician's survey of 500 patients).
10642 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,777 (1977).
107 See Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1294 (W.D. Okla.
1977), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert.
filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605); Rizzo v. United States,
432 F. Supp. 356, 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); N.Y. Times, December 21, 1975, at 40,
col. 1. But see 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,777 (1977).
10 8 See THE A mmacAN HEr=TAGE DrcTIoNARY 416 (1969).

The dictionary

provides a useful explanation of the distinction between "effective," "efficacious,"
and "effectual." "Effective" and "effectual" imply a proven capacity; "efficacious"
implies a potential one. Laetrile may be an efficacious cancer drug, but it is not
an effective one.
109 See Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1293 (W.D. Okla.
1977) (court upheld FDA decision that laetrile is not generally recognized as safe
and effective), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978); petition for
cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605). See also Gadler v.
United States, 425 F. Supp. 244, 247 (D. Minn. 1977); Hanson v. United States,
417 F. Supp. 30, 35-36 (D. Minn. 1976). In these cases seeking preliminary injunctions to obtain laetrile, courts found that plaintiffs could not show substantial probability of success. Cf. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,786 (1977) (rulemaking procedure
of FDA holds that laetrile is not generally recognized as effective).
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ment. 110 Similarly, a significant number of medical journals and
periodicals oppose the use of laetrile due to its proven ineffectiveness.-" This lack of general recognition was further demonstrated
by the expert testimony at the recent FDA proceeding. Over thirty
highly-qualified cancer researchers and physicians testified that the
clear consensus of opinion within the field is that laetrile is useless. 112 Even taking into account the views of those physicians and
experts who favor the use of laetrile, 113 it is clear that there is insufficient support for a finding of generally recognized effectiveness.' 4
The preceding discussion yields two important conclusions.
First, the existing scientific evidence indicates that laetrile is not
actually safe and effective. As a result, it is unlikely that the drug
will be approved for marketing by the new drug application process.
Second, the drug is not presently "generally recognized as safe and
effective" by qualified experts. Therefore, it cannot be marketed
as a cancer drug under the Act unless a grandfather clause exemption is applicable.
2. Exemption Status
As previously noted,"1 5 the stringent substantive and procedural
requirements governing the grandfather clause exemptions effectively deter their invocation in most cases. Nevertheless, laetrile
proponents have, on several occasions, tried to circumvent the FDA's
prohibition by appealing to the courts for an exemption from
the Act.
Attempts to exempt laetrile under the 1938 grandfather clause
have been rebuffed by the courts because of insufficient evidence to
110 Organizations that question the efficacy of laetrile include the American
Cancer Society, the National Cancer Institute, the American Medical Association, the
Committee on Neoplastic Diseases of the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Food
and Drug Administration, and the Canadian Food and Drug Directorate. See 42
Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,781 (1977); Laetrile Myth, supra note 85, at 6.
"I See, e.g., DiPalma, Laetrile: When is a Drug Not a Drug?, 15 Am. FAm.
PHys. 186 (1977); Greenburg, The Vitamin Feud in Cancer Quackery, 122 W.J.
MED. 345 (1975); Jukes, Laetrile for Cancer, 236 J. AMA 1284 (1976); Morris,
Potential for Tragedy in Public Overplay of Cancer "Cures," 113 CAN. MED. A.J.
465 (1975); 170 CHEST 407 (1976); 169 CHEST 331 (1976).
112 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,781-85 (1977).
13 A total of 11 physicians with varying qualifications testified or submitted
affidavits to the Food and Drug Administration in support of laetrile's claimed
effectiveness. Id. 39,785-86.
114 Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977), aff'd
as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47
U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605); see text accompanying notes
55-57 supra.

115 See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra.
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make a showing of compliance with the terms of the clause." 86
Several factors justified this conclusion. First, no evidence indicates7
that the past and present compositions of laetrile are identical."
Second, the manner in which laetrile was labeled prior to 1938 is
unknown. 18 Third, no evidence demonstrates that laetrile's conditions of use (dosage, manner of administration, etc.) have remained
consistent over the past four decades." 9
Efforts to claim a 1962 grandfather clause exemption for laetrile
have been more successful: the district court in Rutherford V struck
down in its entirety the FDA's prohibition of laetrile on the ground
that the drug was exempt from federal regulation under the 1962
provision.120 In reaching its decision the court found that laetrile
was generally recognized as safe by qualified experts in 1962. Because the case was certified as a class action,' 2' the court's finding
may have a significant impact on the federal regulation of laetrile,
and therefore should be scrutinized closely.
The court's finding that laetrile was generally recognized as
safe in 1962 is flawed in two respects. In weighing the conflicting
testimony of laetrile's proponents and detractors, the court emphasized the former's practical experience with the drug. 22 This reliance on practical experience, while embodying some superficial
appeal, has the effect of selecting a biased sample of the expert
opinion. Those researchers who believe in laetrile are likely to
go on using it; those who have determined that the drug is worthless will stop. Thus, in making the determination that laetrile was
generally recognized as safe, the court used a sample that was smaller
than the FDA's and included a higher percentage of laetrile
116 See Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1298 (W.D. Okla.
1977), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert.
filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605); Gadler v. United States,
425 F. Supp. 244, 247-48 (D. Minn. 1977); Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp.
30, 36 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 540 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976).
117 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,789 (1977).
118 See id. 39,790; Gadler v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 244, 248 (D. Minn.
1977).
119 Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1298 (W.D. Okla. 1977),
aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47
U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605); Gadler v. United States, 425
F. Supp. 244, 248 (D. Minn. 1977).
120 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1295 (W.D. Okla. 1977), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049
(10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10,
1978) (No. 78-605).
121 See note 11 supra.
122 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1293, 1295 n.18 (W.D. Okla. 1977), aff'd as modified,
No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278
(U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605).
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supporters. In effect, the court merely concluded that among laetrile
proponents, the drug was generally recognized as safe in 1962.
A second problem with the court's finding is that it fails to
deem significant the fact that there is no pre-1962 scientific literature
that documents laetrile's safety. In 1973, the Supreme Court construed the phrase "generally recognized" as it appears in 21 U.S.C.
§ 3 21(p) to require that any expert consensus be "based on controlled clinical experimentation and backed by substantial support
in scientific literature." 123 To the extent that the same phrase in
the pre-1962 version of the section has the same meaning, the finding that laetrile was "generally recognized" by qualified experts as
safe in 1962 must also have "substantial support in the scientific
literature." 124 The Rutherford V court's references to one laboratory study1 25 and to two "authoritative" 126 publications that were
at least twelve years old in 1962 127 hardly qualify as substantial
support.
C. Applicability of the Statute to the Terminally Ill
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Rutherford VI alters the focus
of the statutory analysis of laetrile. Rather than deciding the questions of general recognition for safety and effectiveness, or the effect
of the grandfather clauses, the court held that the Act does not
apply to terminally-ill cancer patients. 128 In arriving at this decision
the court made several unwarranted assumptions.
Before examining the validity of these assumptions, it is useful
to consider the effects of the decision. First, it removes a large class
of persons from the protection of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act. Second, although the statute was enacted to protect the drugconsuming public, the Rutherford VI court reasoned that terminally-ill patients have no need of this statutory protection because
12 3 Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 652 (1973); see Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 632 (1973).
12 4 Veinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 652 (1973).
125 Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1297 n.23 (W.D. Okla.

1977), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert.
filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605).
126 Id. 1298 n.24.
127 Id.
128 See Rutherford v. United States, No. 77-2049, slip op. at 5 (10th Cir. July
10, 1978) (Rutherford VI), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Oct. 10,
1978) (No. 78-605). See also Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287
(W.D. Okla. 1977) (Rutherford V), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (1oth Cir.),

petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605); Comment, Freedom of Choice in Medical Treatment: Reconsidering the Efflcaci Requirement of the FDCA, 9 Loy. Cm. L.J. 205 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Freedom of
Choice].
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their death is inevitable. This reasoning could open the market to
a flood of unsafe and useless nostrums directed to the terminally ill.
Before acceding to such a dramatic reduction in patient protection,
the underlying bases of the court's reasoning should be scrutinized.
The court assumed that it is easy to define a class consisting of
terminally-ill patients. The court stated that "[ilt would not seem
difficult to define the group to which this determination of a legal
issue applies. A licensed medical practitioner can express an opinion as to whether, under the present state of the art, a particular
person is terminally ill with cancer, and to so certify." 129 Given
the impact in diminished drug protection of being certified as terminally ill under the court's reasoning, allowing this decision to be
made independently by any one doctor is not justifiable. The court
erroneously assumed that terminal patients are an easily-definable
class. In fact, in many cases, there is no reliable distinction between
terminal and non-terminal patients.130 In light of the difficulty of
applying its reasoning, the court is too cavalier in removing the
protections of the Act.
The Tenth Circuit also incorrectly assumed "that no applicable
or reasonable measure exists" to determine a drug's safety and effectiveness for a terminally-ill patient. 131 In regard to safety, this
argument is patently wrong. A drug that accelerates death is "unsafe," even for the terminally ill. Proper controls, such as those
normally instituted by the FDA, keep these dangerous drugs off the
market. Similarly, it is erroneous to assume that all treatments are
equally effective for terminal patients. Some orthodox treatments
are "effective" in that they have a proven capacity to prolong the
patient's life; 132 laetrile's effectiveness is unproven for any class of
cancer patient. 38 There is, therefore, a reasonable standard to
determine a drug's safety and effectiveness for the terminally ill: a
drug that shortens a patient's life expectancy is unsafe; a drug that
fails to lengthen life expectancy, especially when other remedies
could do so, is ineffective.
129 No. 77- 2049, slip op. at 5 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. fied,
47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605).
130 This definitional problem is inherent in the nature of the disease. Cancer
varies greatly in its behavior, rate of growth, pattern of spread, symptoms, effects
on organs, and chances of recovery for the patient. Physicians are therefore unable
to predict the outcome of cancer at any given stage of development. 42 Fed. Reg.
39,767, 39,779 (1977); Laetrile Myth, supra note 85, at 8.
'3' No. 77-2049, slip op. at 5 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert. fled.
47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct 10, 1978) (No. 78-605).
132 Laetrile Myth, supra note 85, at 5-6.
133 See text accompanying notes 99-106 supra.
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Even if the erroneous assumptions made by the Rutherford VI
court were correct, the decision would still not be justifiable. The
statute does not mandate a comparison of the relative effectiveness
of possible remedies. 3 4 Rather, it sets up an objective, scientific
standard that clearly is intended to apply to all drugs facing regulation.
Thus, the action taken by the Tenth Circuit exceeds its adjudicatory function. The court did not interpret the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act; it judicially amended the Act to create an exception that the drafters did not intend to include. The court
should have deferred to Congress to amend the Act and provide the
exception. Indeed, there is legislation pending in Congress that
would permit the FDA to consider the relative safety and effectiveness of drugs intended for terminal patients. 3 5 For the reasons
stated above, a judicially-created exception to the Act for terminal
patients must be based on constitutional rather than statutory
grounds.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The legal status of laetrile under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act 1386 (the "Act") is not dispositive of all the issues in
question. An underlying issue that must be addressed in order to
resolve conclusively the laetrile controversy is the extent of the
government's constitutional authority to regulate an individual's
privately-made decision to use laetrile as a cancer treatment.
There are two philosophical bases supporting the state's power
to control personal health care. One, grounded in the social contract theory, sanctions governmental interference with individual
liberty when a person's actions threaten the welfare of the collective
community. 3 7 The other maintains that self-destructive conduct,
184 1962 SENATz REPORT, supra note 35, at 8,
NEws at 2892.

[1962 U.S.

CODE

CONG. & AD.

135 S. 2755, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 42-43, 124 CONG. REc. 3871 (1978); H.R.
11611, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 42-43, 124 CONG. REc. 2184 (1978). The proposed
legislation would eliminate the new drug application licensing concept and replace
it with a three-phase approval process. First, in the innovational or discovery stage,
studies would be conducted on animals and some humans. Second, the drug sponsor
would continue tests designed to document the drug's safety and effectiveness and
develop information on conditions of use. Third, the approval process would conclude with the manufacturer's application for a drug monograph and a marketing
license. The monograph would identify the drug's ingredients, prescribe standards
for use and distribution, and describe the products covered. See [1978] FOOD
DRuG Cos. L. REP. (CCH) 142,217.
136 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976).
137 People v. Privitera, 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, 959 n.9, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764, 777
n.9 (1977), quoting J.S. MILL, ON LBERTY 17-18 (G. Routledge ed. 1905). Mill
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such as suicide, narcotics abuse, or even riding a motorcycle unhelmeted, can be regulated or prohibited. 138 These principles pose
two fundamental questions that are crucial to a constitutional analysis of laetrile regulation: (1) Does an individual's use of laetrile
threaten the collective community? and (2) Is an individual's use of
laetrile tantamount to self-destructive behavior? If the state can
prove that either question should be answered in the affirmative, it
is probable that laetrile use can be constitutionally prohibited.
A proper constitutional analysis of this problem involves a
three-step approach. First, the nature of the individual interests
affected by the government's regulation of personal health care is
examined in light of recent cases that found a constitutional right
to use laetrile. Second, several of the government's interests in
prohibiting the commercial and personal use of laetrile are balanced
against these personal interests. Third, the applicability of this
balance is considered for all classes of patients and in light of possible alternative means to achieve these governmental goals.
A. PersonalHealth Care Interests
Proponents of laetrile argue that the regulations of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and similar state laws, 13 9 deprive them of
a constitutional right to obtain and use particular health care treatments. Recent laetrile cases have supported this position by recognizing the constitutional right of cancer patients to obtain and use
laetrile, 140 and also the independent right of physicians to prescribe
it without interference.' 41 These cases establish that the right to
choose a particular form of health care is fundamental. Thus, any
notes that "[tihe only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself,
his independence is of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind,
the individual is sovereign." Id.
138 See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n.15 (1973);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
139The California Cancer Law, CAL. HEALT- & SAor-TY CoDE § 1707.1 (West
1970), prohibits the sale, purchase, prescription, or administration of unapproved
cancer treatments such as laetrile. Patients will therefore face the same difficulties
as encountered under the Federal Act in their attempts to obtain and use desired
drugs.
140 See Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1298-1301 (W.D. Okla.
1977), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert.
filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605); People v. Privitera, 74
Cal. App. 3d 936, 947-52, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764, 769-72 (1977); Suenram v. Society
of Valley Hospital, 155 N.J. Super. 593, 601-03, 383 A.2d 143, 148 (1977).
141 See People v. Privitera, 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, 952-54, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764,
773-74 (1977).
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restrictions upon this right must be justified by "compelling" state
1 42
interests, narrowly drawn.
43 and Suenram v. Society of
Rutherford V, People v. Privitera,1
Valley Hospital 144 grounded this fundamental right within the constitutionally-recognized right of privacy 145 -a right that is the subject
of considerable dispute as to its origins 146 and its breadth1 47 Although the Supreme Court has never specifically extended the right
2
14 The court in Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla.
1977) (Rutherford V), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978),
petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605), held
that "[w]hen certain 'fundamental rights' are invoked, such as the right of privacy

involved herein, regulation may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' and
legislative enactments 'must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake."
438 F. Supp. at 1300 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155
(1973)). See People v. Privitera, 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, 947, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764,
769 (1977). For an examination of whether the government has compelling interests
to overcome a fundamental privacy right, see notes 189-211 infra & accompanying
text. For an examination of the narrowness of the current regulations, see notes
212-26 infra & accompanying text.
143 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1977).
144 155 N.J. Super. 593, 383 A.2d 143 (1977).
145 See Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1299 (W.D. Okla.
1977), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert.
filed, 47 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605); People v. Privitera, 74
Cal. App. 3d 936, 946, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764, 768 (1977); Suenram v. Society of Valley
Hospital, 155 N.J. Super. 593, 602-03, 383 A.2d 143, 148 (1977).
146 The right of privacy is never mentioned explicitly in the Constitution. In a
number of Supreme Court cases, however, different Justices have found various
justifications for its recognition as a constitutional nrinciple. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Douglas maintained that the right of privacy
is grounded in the "penumbras" that emanate from the more specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights. Id. 484-85. in the same case, Justice Goldberg found the right
to stem from the ninth amendment's protection of unenumerated rights, id. 486-87
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
In the 1973 abortion decisions, Justice Blackmun,
speaking for the Court, found the source of the privacy right to lie in the concept
of "ordered liberty" guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153 (1973); accord, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). Other
possible sources of the right of privacy include the first amendment, see Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969), and the fourth and fifth amendments, see Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
.47 judges have lamented the fact that the privacy right is undefined and
unwieldy. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530 n.7 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The privacy
right has been described as "the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwarranted governmental intrusions," Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969), and "the right to be let alone," Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Commentators have written extensively concerning the right to privacy and its
nebulous boundaries. See, e.g., Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law,
31 L.kw & CONTEMP. PROB. 253 (1966); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 929 (1973); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy,
74 CoLr.: M. L. Rrv. 1410 (1974); Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a
Principle?, 26 STAN-.L. REv. 1160 (1974).
See also Gerety, Redefining Privacy,
12 HAav. Civ. RTs.-Civ. Lra. L. REv. 233 (1977); Note, Toward a Constitutional
Theory of Individuality: The Privacy Opinions of Justice Douglas, 87 YALE L.J. 1579
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Privacy Opinions].
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of privacy to cover personal health care choices, 148 it has protected
privacy interests in many closely-related areas, including marriage,1 49
contraception,'" and procreation. 151 The validity of the recent
cases that declare it a fundamental right to choose laetrile must be
examined in light of these Supreme Court decisions.
1. Protected Zones of Privacy
Arguments in favor of a constitutional right to decide whether
to obtain and use laetrile characterize the decision as protected because it is within a constitutional zone of privacy, and thus is immune from all but compelling governmental interference. Rutherford V relied upon Roe v. Wade 152 to support this view.153 Roe
established that a woman's decision whether to undergo an abortion
is constitutionally protected. Although courts considering laetrile
view this case as establishing a zone of privacy around health care
decisions, the Supreme Court decided the case on the basis of a zone
of privacy around the decision whether or not to bear a child. 54
Similarly, the cases that established the right to use contraceptivesGriswold v. Connecticut 15 and Eisenstadt v. Baird 150-found the
birth control decision to be protected by the privacy of the marital
relationship 187 and by the privacy of the decision whether to "bear
or beget a child," 18 not by a privacy right to choose a particular
form of medical treatment. The identification of the right to choose
a specific form of health care, therefore, does not automatically flow
159
from the abortion cases.
148 For an examination of the right to privacy in the health care context, see
Comment Picking Your Poison: The Drug Eicacy Requirement and the Right of

Privacy, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 577, 590-607 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Picking
Your Poison].
149 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.

479 (1965).

150 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
151 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
152 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
153 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1299 (W.D. Okla. 1977), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049
(1oth Cir. July 10, 1978), Petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Oct. 10,
1978) (No. 78-605).
154 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
15 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
186 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
157 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
158 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
189 One argument against an automatic extension of the privacy right to laetrile
users is that the Court has been reluctant formally to extend the right of privacy
into new areas of personal decisionmaking. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,
425 U.S. 901 (1976) (homosexuality); Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 523
F.2d 716 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976) (father's interest in observing
his wife's delivery of their child).
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Courts that have found a constitutional right to use laetrile also
have relied upon the idea that the control of one's body is constitutionally protected. 1 0 There are several nonconstitutional cases that
establish the principle of bodily inviolability.' 61 Privitera,for example, quotes from Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,162
a case providing civil remedies for the infringement of bodily integrity, as support for this proposition. Similarly, the federal
government has accorded great weight to the interest in bodily
integrity. 163 In addition, a constitutional right to bodily control
may be derived from the fourth amendment's protection of "persons" in the physical sense. 6 4 Although this right typically is implicated in criminal searches and seizures, 65 cases finding a constitutional cause of action 166 in a forced medical operation on a
prisoner1 67 support the proposition that the body is protected by
the fourth amendment in the medical as well as in the criminal
context. The state's withholding of access to laetrile therefore intrudes upon an individual's legitimate expectation of dominion
over his physical self.
A question arises, however, as to the extent of this interest in
bodily integrity. There is a continuum of possible bodily intrusions; forcing a person to undergo unwanted treatment is the most
excessive. In cases involving a patient's decision to refuse treatment, courts have found that the government's interests are not
sufficiently compelling to justify infringement upon individual
sovereignty. 68 In contrast, the denial of a patient's free choice to
160 The right to control one's body is considered an essential element of personal
autonomy, one of the basic reference points of the right of privacy. See Gerety,

supra note 147, at 266 n.119. See generally Lister, The Right to Control the Use of
One's Body, in TrE RIGHTS oF A ammaxc-s 348 (1971).
161 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d
1 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
162 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Bing v.
Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957), cited in People v.
Privitera, 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, 948, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764, 770 (1977).
163 See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); cases
involving prisoners' right to health care, cited in Questionable Drugs, supra note 51,
at 398 nn.116-18. It is an additional step, however, to say that the right not to be
deprived of care includes a right to choose a particular type of care.
164 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (mandatory blood tests
of suspected drunk drivers permitted because highway safety can be viewed as
compelling interest).
165 E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
16642 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
167 Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1974).
168 See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1
(1972) (competent patient has right of bodily control and may choose whether to
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obtain and use any potential treatment regardless of its safety and
efficacy appears to be a lesser intrusion. The right of bodily control
is limited, 169 and even intrusions that directly impinge upon the
body have been upheld when the state has a sufficiently compelling
170
interest.
Another basis for finding a constitutional right to obtain and
use laetrile, recognized by both Rutherford V and Privitera, is the
protected nature of the doctor-patient relationship. Doe v. Bolton,'7
one of the 1973 abortion cases, recognized a "woman's right to
receive medical care in accordance with her licensed physician's
best judgment, and the physician's right to administer it." 172 In
addition, Justice Douglas, concurring in Doe, stated that "[t]he
right of privacy has no more conspicuous place than in the physician-patient relationship." 173 Further evidence of the Supreme
Court's solicitude for the physician-patient relationship can be
found in Whalen v. Roe, 7 4 in which the Court, even though upholding a state statute that required the reporting of prescriptions
for various drugs, noted in dictum that a patient and his advising
undergo lawful operation); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied,
429 U.S. 922 (1976) (guardian of permanently comatose woman was permitted to
enforce the woman's privacy right to be free of bodily intrusions by life-sustaining
machines); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 196 9 )
(competent patient allowed to decline blood transfusion despite risk of death). But
see Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (court may allow hospital to
administer emergency blood transfusion to unconsenting and arguably incompetent
Jehovah's Witness).
109 [I]t is not clear to us that the claim . . . that one has an unlimited
right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the
right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court
has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (citations omitted). See also Henkin,
supra note 147, at 1429; Tribe, Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of
Life and Law, 87 H.Atv. L. REv. 1, 39 (1973).
170 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (limitation on right of bodily
control because of state interests in preserving health of mother, standards of medical
practice, and life of viable fetus); Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (limitation
on right of bodily control in case of compulsory vaccination because of state health
interest in preventing smallpox epidemic); Minnesota Board of Health v. City of
Brainerd, 308 Minn. 24, 241 N.W.2d 624, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 (1976)
(limitation on right of bodily control in case of fluoridation of city water supply,
due to state interest in public health).
171410 U.S. 179 (1973).
172 Id. 197; accord, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
173 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 219 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). For a
discussion of Justice Douglas' views on the right to privacy, see Privacy Opinions,
supra note 147.
174 429 U.S. 589 (1977).

262

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 127:233

physician can independently decide to acquire and use needed drugs
for personal health care. 75
When a fundamental right to decide exists, a right of access to
the means of effectuating that decision also exists. In Carey v.
PopulationServices International,1'7 6 the Supreme Court clarified its
decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird,7 7 by explicitly holding that the same
strict scrutiny that is applied to statutes outlawing a protected choice
must be applied to regulations that burden an individual's right to
decide to use contraceptives or that limit his access to contraceptives.' 78 In the laetrile context, this holding means that a fundamental right to make the choice to use laetrile cannot be nullified
by limiting access to the drug.
2. Privacy Rights of Health Care Professionals
Some courts have recognized an independent right of physicians
to prescribe and treat patients "free from unjustified state interference." 179 This independent right was recognized by the Privitera
court as implicit in Doe v. Bolton. 8 0
It is unlikely, however, that doctors have an independent right
to administer any treatment they desire.

First, "[i]t is . .

.

well

settled that the State has broad police powers in regulating the
administration of drugs by the health profession." 11 Second, the
Supreme Court cases that have considered the right to administer
treatment have always done so in the context of the right to receive
it.182 Indeed, the Court has suggested that doctor's independent
175

Id. 603.

176431 U.S. 678 (1977).
177 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

178 The Court in Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977),
explained that "[t]his is not because there is an independent fundamental 'right of
access . . .

,'

but because such access is essential to exercise of the constitutionally

protected right of decision." Id. 688.
179 See, e.g., People v. Privitera, 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, 952-54, 141 Cal. Rptr.
764, 773-74 (1977).
180 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973) (state statute requiring physicians other than the
patients' own to approve an abortion infringed patients' right to receive medical
treatment and doctors' right to administer it).
181 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977) (citations omitted). See
also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-65 (1962); Barsky v. Board of
Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954).
182 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court's decisions involving the
health care interests of doctors have focused primarily on the standing aspect of this
interest. Nevertheless, these cases delineate the substantive rights of physicians as
well, acknowledging their right of privacy only in the context of patients' right to
determine personal treatment.
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rights deserve less strict protection than the rights of their patients. 8 3
Third, because the nature of medical practice is primarily economic,
physicians' interests in health care may be subject to regulation as
a commercial right.'8 4 Other health care professionals, such as
pharmacists and drug manufacturers, will probably also fail to prove
any infringement upon their economic rights, because a low-level
test will be applied to their complaints. 8 5
Although there is no support for an independent right of
doctors to administer particular drugs and treatments, the cases do
support the existence of a derivative right. 8 6 Moreover, on some
occasions, courts relax the normal standing rules, and allow physicians to attack governmental drug regulations as violative of a
patient's fundamental right to determine the nature of the treat87
ment he is to receive.
3. Summary
Supreme Court decisions dealing with health-care matters,
bodily control, and the physician-patient relationship do not conclusively establish that personal health-care decisions are protected
by the right of privacy. Nevertheless, several courts and commentators have concluded that a cancer patient's choice of medical
treatment is entitled to strict constitutional protection. 8 8 Therefore, this discussion of the constitutionality of the current laetrile
regulations will proceed on the assumption that a cancer patient
has a fundamental right to determine the method of his treatment,
183 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.33 (1977). The Court stated that
Doe v. Bolton had not suggested that the physician's rights had "any greater strength
than his patient's... [i]f [those obstacles to obtaining an abortion in Doe v. Bolton]
had merely made the physician's work . . . less independent without any impact
on the patient, they would not have violated the Constitution." Id.
84
1
But see People v. Privitera, 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, 953, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764,
773 (1977) ("[tlhe more recent cases hint at the more profound right in the
doctor . . . . There exists in the doctor licensed to practice medicine a right
constitutional in nature . . . to treat . . . an informed consenting patient.").
185 See Questionable Drugs, supra note 51, at 409.
186 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
187 The Supreme Court has extended to health care professionals standing to
assert the rights of patients. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (lecturer
who distributed contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(physician and director of birth control clinic).
188 See generally Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla.
1977), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978) (not reaching
constitutional issue), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978)
(No. 78-605); People v. Privitera, 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1977);
Freedom of Choice, supra note 128, at 216; Questionable Drugs, supra note 51, at
399; Comment, Restrictions on Unorthodox Health Treatment in California: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 647, 680-89 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Unorthodox Treatment].
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subject to governmental restriction only upon the demonstration of
a compelling state interest.
B. Government Interests in ProhibitingLaetrile
The principal government interest in maintaining the current
laetrile ban is the protection of the regulatory system instituted by
Congress through the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, to maintain a
pre-marketing requirement of demonstrable safety and effectiveness
and to ensure a scientific approach to drug testing. Preceding
sections of this Comment established that laetrile is not marketable
under the Act as it is presently written. 8 9 As a result, an exception
to the general requirements of proving safety and effectiveness
threatens the survival of this aspect of the Act. Congress found
that the public needs protection from drugs that have not been
proven to be both safe and effective. 90 It chose to implement this
policy through the creation of new drug application procedures that
place the burden of proof on drug producers.' 91
The present attacks on the Act by laetrile supporters go beyond
the controversy surrounding that particular drug; if these attacks
are successful, the government will not be able to force a manufacturer to prove a drug's safety and effectiveness before the manufacturer releases it to an unsuspecting public. Allowing laetrile to
be marketed in an unproven condition, therefore, adversely affects
the collective well-being by removing or weakening an important
societal protection.
Although some commentators question the constitutionality of
the drug efficacy requirements,' 9" the application of the statute has
been upheld. 93 Thus, the government has a compelling interest in
preserving the standards of the Act. There are several interests
implicit in the federal drug regulations, however, that can also be
considered compelling. This Comment will examine these objectives more closely, in the specific context of the laetrile controversy.
1. Protecting Individuals from Drugs of Unproven Safety
A major governmental interest implicit in the establishment of
the federal drug laws is the protection of both the general public
189 See text accompanying notes 23-135 supra.
190 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1976). For an explanation of congressional intent,
see 1962 SENATE REPORT, note 35 supra, [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2884.
19121 U.S.C. § 355 (1976).
192 See, e.g., Freedom of Choice, supra note 128.
193 Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973);

Rutherford v. AMA, 379 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1043,

rehearing denied, 390 U.S. 975 (1968); Tutoki v. Celebrezze, 375 F.2d 105 (7th

Cir. 1967).
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and specific individuals from dangerous drugs.0 4 The right to
choose a particular health care treatment clearly is outweighed by
the government's obligation to prevent damage to the general
public, as evidenced in the thalidomide crisis, and by the need to
prevent an individual's self-destruction through ingestion of a
hazardous substance. The government, therefore, faces no constitutional obstacle in limiting the availability of decidedly unsafe drugs.
The regulation of drugs of uncertain danger, however, is more
problematic.
As has previously been discussed, 195 the latest scientific evidence
indicates that laetrile is not safe, 0 6 but its danger has not been
established conclusively. While the evidence suggesting that laetrile
is not safe gives the government a legitimate interest in its regulation, the important question is whether the probability and gravity
of its dangers are sufficiently substantial to make this interest
I
compelling.
Recorded instances 197 of death and poisoning from laetrile show
that the gravity of the harm is substantial. Present knowledge does
not indicate, however, that the probability of the harm is also great.
First, so far as is known, only a small number of persons have
actually sustained injury from use of the drug. Second, there is no
evidence indicating that adverse side effects occur more frequently
198
with laetrile use than with other medical treatments.
The government's interest in protecting the populace from unsafe drugs may not be compelling at this time in the case of laetrile;
the mounting evidence of laetrile's dangers, however, may make it
compelling in the future. Other interests implicit in the federal
regulations must therefore be found to justify an infringement of
personal autonomy.
2. Preventing the Delay of Effective Treatment
A second state interest in the regulation of unproven drugs is
the protection of the public from the use of ineffective drugs. Reliance upon an ineffective drug can be deterimental to a patient's
19 4 See Picking Your Poison, supra note 148, at 608-09.
195 See text accompanying notes 83-92 supra.
196 See notes 84-86 supra.
197 Id.
198 Studies show that many patients die or suffer detrimental side effects due
to incompetent doctoring and unexpected reactions to medication when treated for
various illnesses. See, e.g., Incompetent Surgery Is Found Not Isolated, N.Y. Times,
January 27, 1976, at 1, col. 7.
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interests by preventing or delaying his use of an effective treatment.199
The possibility that patients will rely on laetrile to the exclusion or delay of conventional therapy has been a matter of concern
to the FDA and the medical establishment. 20 0 Several courts have
upheld the proscription of laetrile on this basis, and accepted the
need to prevent delay of effective treatment as a substantial government objective. 201 This interest assumes, however, that cancer can
202
be treated effectively by other drugs or methods.
As previously established, although there is no cure for cancer,
certain treatments can effectively treat particular types of cancer
and either prevent, delay, or ameliorate its attendant infirmities. 20
Removing the laetrile ban would surely result in some cancer
patients deliberately foregoing a more effective treatment. Such
behavior reasonably may be classified as self-destructive, 204 and the
government's interest in preventing such a result is compelling.
199 See Durovic v. Richardson, 479 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 944 (1973) (in case of life-threatening disease, "safe" necessarily implies
"effective"); United States v. Nutrition Service, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 375, 388 (W.D.
Pa. 1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1965). Cf. 17 CAL. Am. CODE § 10400.1
(1963) (California Health Department ruled that ineffective cancer remedies such
as laetrile are more harmful than state-sanctioned alternatives).
200 See 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,769 (1977); Laetrile Myth, &upranote 85, at
8-9 (physician's case history of laetrile user who failed to seek conventional treatment and died needlessly).
201 See, e.g., United States v. General Research Laboratories, 397 F. Supp.
197, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (explicitly finding delay to be dangerous); People v.
Privitera, 55 Cal. App. 3d 39, 52, 128 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1976), rev'd, 74 Cal. App.
3d 936, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1977).
202 See Questionable Drugs, supra note 51, at 401.
203 See note 132 supra.
204 Contra, Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1299 n.25 (W.D.
Okla. 1977), aff'd as modified, No. 77-2049 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert.
filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605). The court explained
that refusing orthodox treatment is not suicidal because there have been reported
cases of untreated cancer victims outliving treated ones. The court also stressed the
unpleasant nature of conventional remedies. This last point may explain why a
patient would choose to forego conventional treatment, but it does not alter the
fundamental self-destructiveness of the act. When a person passes up a chance of
recovery, either to use a totally ineffective remedy or even to use no remedy at all,
there is a chance that this decision will not be harmful. On the whole, however,
such a decision evidences a lack of concern for one's safety that may be vitiated by
government intervention.
Not all self-destructive acts are regulable. When a patient refuses to submit
to treatment altogether, courts may find that there is no government interest compelling enough to force treatment. See In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C.
1972). There is quite a difference, however, between forcing someone to take a
treatment they wish to refuse, and refusing to allow a patient to use a drug that
will do them no good. The latter is a much lesser restriction on individual liberty,
and has fewer corollary effects on persons other than the patient. See text accompanying note 205 infra.
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There is an additional component to the interest in preventing
the delay of effective treatment, which increases its constitutional
significance: the use of laetrile affects patients other than those who
knowingly choose to use an ineffective treatment. The removal of
the ban for these patients inevitably legitimizes the drug's use by the
general public. 205 As a result, other, less knowing, patients will also
be induced to use laetrile rather than a more effective treatment,
thereby threatening the collective welfare of the community.
3. Preventing Deception of the Public
The third major component of federal drug regulation is protecting the drug-consuming public from misleading claims of effectiveness. 206 Cancer has a devastating effect on the emotions and
outlook of the victim and his family. Moreover, cancer patients
are particularly vulnerable to exploitation because they face an uncertain probability of recovery and treatment methods that impose
acute emotional and physical difficulties. 20 7 Because patient vulnerability has been exploited many times in the past,20 8 the government
is wary of alleged cancer cures. This legitimate concern gives the
government an interest in ensuring that drugs made available as
cancer treatments have met certain effectiveness standards. Laetrile
has not been able to meet these standards.
Some aspects of the manner of laetrile's promotion add greater
credence to the government's fear of public exploitation. The drug
is "sold" at conventions, meetings, and private gatherings through
the employment of testimonials, films, and books.20 9 In addition,
some laetrile promoters have made extremely questionable medical
claims-namely, that the drug is an essential new vitamin (vitamin
205 Carnohan v. United States, No. 77-0010-GT, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Cal., filed
Jan. 21, 1977). To weaken the existing drug laws "could also further the growing
tendency of those afflicted with this disease to engage in self treatment resulting in
a delay in seeking early diagnosis and prompt treatment with forms of therapy that
have established value." Id. (quoting Morgan v. Mathews, No. 76-1637 (S.D. Cal.,
filed Nov. 30, 1976)). See generally Picking Your Poison, supra note 148, at 613-14.
206 Because the majority of major cancer studies express doubt that laetrile
cures or mitigates the disease, this Comment treats such claims for laetrfle as
misleading.
20742 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,798 (1977).
208
See People v. Privitera, 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, 979-80, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764,
791 (1977) (dissenting opinion); 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,795-97 (1977); Janssen,
supra note 2, at 27-32; Quack Laws, supra note 2, at 402. In each decade of the
twentieth century there have been alleged miracle cancer drugs and treatments that
have been heavily promoted to the financial and emotional detriment of the public.
All of these alleged remedies-Millure, Krebiozen, Rand Vaccine, Hoxsey method,
Koch Antitoxins, and Doctor Johnson's Treatment-proved to be totally ineffective.
20942 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,799-800 (1977).
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B17) and is an effective treatment for all types of cancer.2 10 The
history of drug fraud in the United States and the unproven nature
of laetrile's effectiveness, coupled with the extravagant claims of
some of its supporters, demonstrate that laetrile poses a potential
threat to the well being of cancer patients.211 In the absence of an
effective system of public disclosure, the government's interest in
preventing deception can be classified as substantial.
C. Less Restrictive Alternatives
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the government's
justification for maintaining the current regulatory scheme encompasses several interests, which, in the aggregate, are compelling. It
remains to be seen, however, whether these interests are applicable to
all classes of patients, or whether there are less restrictive means to
effectuate these objectives. When fundamental rights are at stake,
government interests need not only be compelling; they must also
be necessary 212 If other methods can achieve these governmental
interests with a lesser impact on individual rights, the more restric2 13
tive method fails to satisfy constitutional standards.
1. A Spectrum of Interests
The articulated governmental interests in controlling the use
of laetrile are particularly compelling in the case of a new cancer
patient who has the greatest chance of recovery through conventional treatment. The question arises, however, whether these interests are equally compelling for all classes of cancer patients. The
distinction drawn by the Rutherford VI court2 1 4 between terminally-ill and nonterminally-ill patients, for example, could be constitutionally mandatory.21 5
210 Id. 39,801-03.

See Janssen, supra note 2, at 30.

Laetrile is also detrimental to the financial well-being of its users since the
drug is very expensive, both in the United States and at foreign clinics. See Lewis,
supra note 3, at 61; N.Y. Times, July 13, 1977, at 8, col. 4; N.Y. Times, April 17,
1977, at 28, col. 1.
212
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
211

213 The Court has often used a "least restrictive means" test. See, e.g., Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960). "[E]ven though the governmental purpose
be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."
Id. 488.
214
No. 77-2049, slip op. at 4-5 (10th Cir. July 10, 1978), petition for cert.
filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-605). See notes 128-35 supra

& accompanying text.
215 See Freedom of Choice, supra note 128, at 220; Picking Your Poison, supra
note 148, at 615-16.
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The government's interests in prohibiting the use of laetrile by
terminal patients are arguably less compelling for two reasons. First,
decisions regarding one's death appear to constitute a higher order
of privacy than general health care decisions; the right to die as one
wishes, in circumstances in which there is no hope of eventual recovery, is closer to the right to decide matters of procreation and
marital intimacy than is the decision to choose one treatment over
another.216 Second, self-destructive behavior seems less objectionable when a patient is terminally ill.
This distinction is not justified. Even if the privacy rights of
the terminally ill are more fundamental, the government's interests
in regulating unproven drugs are compelling. The points made
earlier about the fallacies in the Rutherford VI opinion regarding
the terminally ill remain valid. 21 7 There often is no reliable distinction between terminal and non-terminal patients. 218 Potentially
aidable patients should not be cast aside. It is also untrue that the
use of laetrile by the terminally ill is not self-destructive behavior.
The scientific evidence establishes that laetrile is essentially useless
for everyone,2 1 9 but other treatments provide some hope of prolonging life, even for those patients classified as terminal. 220
The government's interests remain compelling 221 even if the
problems created by an exception for the terminally ill are deemed
insignificant. The use of laetrile by any particular group may increase instances of fraud and encourage other patients to forego
difficult conventional treatment for easy laetrile therapy. 222 There
is a grave potential for abuse when supplies of an otherwise illegal
and ineffective drug are made available for use by an ill-defined
class of patients.
Some commentators have suggested that laetrile be provided as
a supplemental treatment. 223 The government theoretically could
have a compelling interest in preventing the exclusive use of the
drug, without being able constitutionally to regulate its supple216 Compare In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (right of privacy
includes right to refuse extraordinary medical procedures to maintain life where
patient is in a vegetative state) with Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 523
F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976) (no right of privacy
violated when public hospital denied couple opportunity to use Lamaze method of
childbirth).
21 7
See notes 130-33 supra & accompanying text.
21842 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,779 (1977); Laetrile Myth, supra note 85, at 8.
219
See notes 101-35 supra.
22
0 Laetrile Myth, supra note 85, at 5-6.
221 See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,805 (1977).
222
Laetrile Myth, supra note 85, at 8.
223 See, e.g., Questionable Drugs, supra note 51, at 407.
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mental use. The government does, however, have compelling interests in preventing this alternative.
Initially, this exception to the general regulation of laetrile
exposes the patient to potentially greater risks. The effects of combined laetrile and conventional therapy are unknown and are not
easily ascertainable. 22 Concurrent use of laetrile may interfere with
the beneficial effects of conventional methods or create new dangers.
In addition, this alternative would provide laetrile with a perceived
legitimacy, through the widespread distribution and use of the drug.
Supplemental use of laetrile would pose administrative problems as
well, and hamper the government's ability to enforce the remaining
aspects of the laetrile prohibition.
2. Fundamental Statutory Changes
The continued ban on laetrile is mandated by compelling
governmental interests for all classes of patients and degrees of use.
However, a closer examination must be made of suggested alternative procedures that may further these governmental interests
with a lesser infringement of individual rights.
One suggested alternative is to eliminate the efficacy requirement of the Act and replace it with a strict reporting and disclosure
provision.225 Unsafe drugs would continue to be prohibited, and a
drug's degree of effectiveness would have to be displayed prominently on its label. The FDA would also maintain its power over
misbranded and falsely-labeled drugs. Under this system, the drugconsuming public, aided by consumer studies, label disclosures, and
scientific data, would be expected to distinguish between valuable
medicine and well-promoted, but useless, substances. The medical
profession would also be available to guide consumer choices.
Another alternative is to shift the threshold standard of proof
for proposed new drugs and established old ones. Instead of requiring affirmative proof of a drug's actual or recognized safety and
effectiveness before permitting marketing, Congress could force the
government to prove actual danger or ineffectiveness in order to
226
prohibit a drug.
Proper study of the effects of drug
22442 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,805 (1977).
interaction is time consuming. The continuing public debate over laetrile's safety
and effectiveness suggests that the probability of harm from the concurrent use of

laetrile would be equally difficult to determine.
225 See Freedom of Choice, supra note 128, at 222; Questionable Drugs, supra
note 51, at 408; Unorthodox Treatment, supra note 188, at 694.
226 See Unorthodox Treatment, supra note 188, at 694. One proposal, introduced in the 95th Congress, would eliminate the effectiveness standard from the
Act and use the FDA's authority over misbranded drugs to monitor the accuracy of
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Although these alternatives would indeed reduce the extent of
the government's interference with privacy rights, they are not acceptable replacements for the current regulatory procedures. Each
of them fails to satisfy the compelling governmental interests that
underly the need for drug regulation. First, they do not adequately
protect the interest in safeguarding the public. Individuals
could suffer serious physical harm from the placement of untested
products on the market. Putting the burden on the government is
not satisfactory: the government does not have the resources to
evaluate each drug product created and marketed by pharmaceutical
companies. Neither of these proposals furthers the government's
interest in preventing the delay of effective treatment. In addition,
these proposals fail because the public, including individual physicians, has neither the expertise nor the time to distinguish between
various drugs and medications. People might use a totally ineffective drug without being fully aware of the consequences. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, these proposals remove the rigid
scientific standards of the present Act. This change would increase
the likelihood of fraud and quackery. Thus, the adoption of these
alternatives or similar proposals would reestablish the impotent
regulatory schemes of past decades and leave the public virtually
defenseless in the field of health care.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The laetrile controversy stands at the junction of two important
and conflicting interests. One is the alleged fundamental privacy
right of patients to choose, obtain, and use desired health care drugs.
The other is the government's compelling interest in preserving the
structure of the federal drug laws and preventing self-destructive
individual behavior or conduct seriously threatening the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens.
The difficult task of reconciling these important interests poses
a significant challenge to judicial and political institutions. The
resolution of the dilemma, however, is clear. The courts, Congress,
and the state legislatures should reaffirm federal drug policy and its
application to laetrile. By continuing to prohibit laetrile, the FDA
can deter some cancer patients from relying upon a potentially
devastating drug and encourage them to seek effective treatment
within the confines of the medical establishment.
claims made by their backers.
123 CONG. REc. 79 (1977).

See H.R. 54, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
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This Comment has supported the prohibition of laetrile on
both statutory and constitutional grounds. Laetrile is not generally
recognized as safe or effective by cancer experts and it cannot justifiably be exempted from the provisions of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act. As a result, the FDA should seek reversal of the
Rutherford VI decision, and should continue to ban laetrile from
commercial or personal transportation in interstate commerce, even
when it is sought for use by terminally-ill cancer patients. Similarly,
a weighing of constitutional values dictates the prohibition of
laetrile and the reaffirmation of the FDA's safety and effectiveness
requirements. The use of laetrile threatens compelling interests
and legitimate governmental policies. These societal interests ultimately outweigh individual privacy interests in health care and
necessitate an infringement upon individual sovereignty.

